As the capital city of a country with the
Introduction
The interconnection between migration, ethnicity and politics has been thoroughly studied, among others, by Fearon and Laitin (2011) . In the case of Indonesia, the recent study by Barter and Cote (2015) clearly shows that local political conflicts closely related with the increasing number of migrants are perceived by the locals as a threat to their livelihoods. As the capital city of the world's fourth largest population country, Jakarta, like many other big cities in the developing economies, for example, Mexico City or New Delhi; hosts migrants from all the regions of the country. The arrival of migrants to Jakarta
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Batavian or Betawi or Djakarta Asli (Castles, 1967) . With Jakarta as the capital, the number of migrants has increased significantly since the Independence of Indonesia in 1945. Without a doubt, Jakarta has developed as the major core of the agglomeration processes transforming the city and its satellite cities into a Mega Urban Region (MUR). 2 The migrants disperse to the satellite cities, therefore, the number in Jakarta has decreased since the mid1990s. However, Jakarta has the most diverse ethnic mix in Indonesia with 9,607,787 inhabitants (Population Census of Indonesia, 2010).
In September 2012, surprisingly Jokowi (Joko Widodo) and his running mate Ahok (Basuki Tjahaja Purnama) won victory in Jakarta's 2012 Gubernatorial Elections. With 54% of votes, these candidates successfully beat the incumbent, Foke (Fauzi Bowo) and Nara (Nachrowi Ramli) who are both native 2 In this article, we consider Jakarta as a city. In fact, we should note that administratively since the 1950s Jakarta has been governed not as a city, but as a province called Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta or the Special Capital Territory of Jakarta, comprising five cities and one district (Bunnell & Miller, 2012) . Furthermore, since the 1970s during the centralized New Order regime emphasizing economic growth, Jakarta has been developed into a MUR called Jabodetabekjur incorporating Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, Bekasi and Cianjur (Firman, 2008 and 2009; Windarsih and Hadi, 2014) .
Betawi Muslims. Since the end of the New Order regime in 1998, the decentralization governance system has provided greater 'power' for both the regional governments and the people to manage their city or region, including by participating in direct regional elections. In fact, local politicians in many areas are mostly reliant on the support of religious leaders considered able to get large numbers of votes (Kloos & Berenschot, 2016) . This certainly put a heavy burden on Jokowi, a Muslim Javanese from Solo and Ahok, a Christian Chinese-Indonesian from the small district of Belitung, who both are migrants to Jakarta. Despite negative ethnoreligious campaigns against them, Miichi (2014) describes their victory as a triumph of democracy, particularly for the Jakartans.
In 2014, since Jokowi was elected president in October, Ahok was inaugurated as Jakarta's new governor in November, amidst protests from the supporters of the losing presidential candidate, Prabowo Subianto, and hard-line Islamic groups. In his early days as the Governor of Jakarta, Ahok experienced opposition from the House of Representatives in terms of contravening the gubernatorial appointment rules as well as budget transparency. Ahok pays great attention to managing the governance system, including Source: http://www.inspired-bali.com/wp1/50-years-in-indonesia/, in which the grey colour, the red dot and the insert of Jakarta are modified by the authors Picture 1 Map of Indonesia with Jakarta Insert planning the dismissal of underachieving civil servants and introducing e-budgeting for transparency, as well as asking property owners to pay fines enabling him to conduct various projects in a short period of time. Therefore, with the bureaucracy of Jakarta becoming much less cumbersome, Ahok is gaining popularity among the Jakartans despite his harsh attitudes. Banking on this popularity, Ahok is certain to run in the next Jakarta Gubernatorial Elections in 2017.
This article discusses the changing role of ethnicity in Jakartans' public life as well as its consequences to the local politics. To some extent the democracy of Indonesia might be a paradox between freer and fairer public space and patronage democracy (Berenschot, Nordholt & Bakker, 2016) . As highlighted by Berenschot, Nordholt and Bakker (2016) , a weakly institutionalized state and mediated access to the state in most of the postcolonial states, including Indonesia, encourage client centered and often identitybased relationships with politicians and other power holders. Therefore organizations, such as ethnic or faith based ones, can be useful lubricants for the client centered exchanges. However, we argue that the recent political developments in Jakarta have apparently been transformed into more civic rather than ethnic politics. The nature of Jakarta as a proliferating migrant city transcends narrow cultural identities as well as conventional party politics into a more active citizenry through the widespread use of social media. In the heat of Jakarta's 2017 Gubernatorial Election, for the first time in history, the front-runner is a Christian Chinese-Indonesian. Since Jakarta is the center of national politics, this new kind of local politics will exemplify substantial democracy for other cities in Indonesia.
The aim of this article is to comprehend the ways migration and ethnic diversity have transformed Jakarta as a city of migrants and the consequences to the local politics. We start by providing some historical context to interpret the nature of Jakarta as a host city of migrants from various ethnic groups. Then, we draw the dynamics of ethnicity and provincial leadership in Jakarta from 1945 to the present. In the third part, we describe the recent Jakarta local politics with an emphasis on Ahok and his political manoeuvers, including the establishment of 'Teman Ahok' (Friend{s} of Ahok) as the social media political campaign platform. Later, we discuss the political contestation for the upcoming Jakarta Gubernatorial Elections. The conclusion highlights to what extend the civic politics is likely to work in Jakarta.
Ethnic Composition of Jakarta
Since its establishment in 1619 by Jan Pieterszoon Coen, Jakarta has become a very attractive city (Abeyasekere, 1987) . At that time, the economic activities of Jakarta were extensive and included farming, plantations, the sugarcane industry as well as brick and roof tile production (Kanumoyoso, 2007) attracting people to move to Jakarta because of the numerous job opportunities. As mentioned, these migrants were from Java's hinterland and various parts of the Archipelago, as well as from East and South Asia. According to Kanumoyoso (2007) , the ethnic identity of migrants in Batavia was getting blurred because of (a) socio-economic interests and geographical proximity, (b) intermarriage among various ethnic groups, (c) common experiences in the military service of the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), (d) religious identity, and (e) slavery institutions enabling migrants to work in a multi-ethnic environment. The presence of various ethnic groups created Batavia and then Jakarta as a multi-ethnic city.
Since the Independence of Indonesia in 1945, the composition of the ethnic groups in Jakarta as a host city of migrants has changed tremendously. While previously, Jakarta welcomed migrants from Europe as well as East and South Asia, their number has Suryadinata, Arifin & Ananta (2003: 19) , Ananta, Arifin, Hasbullah, Handayani & Pramono (2015: 106) .
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While data on ethnic groups was considered politically taboo by the New Order regime, this question is reinstated in the Population Census in the reformasi period. Indonesia consists of various ethnic groups and local languages; therefore, understanding those diversities is part of establishing Bhinneka Tunggal Ika or Unity in Diversity in our nation. From Population Censuses in 2000 and 2010, we can observe that the four major ethnic groups in Jakarta remain Betawi, Sundanese, Javanese and Chinese followed by Batak, Minangkabau and Malay (Table 1) . However, the number of Sundanese is decreasing if compared with the 1961 Population Census. This puts Sundanese only in the third rank following Javanese and Betawi. Meanwhile, the number of people of Chinese ethnicity consistently stays in the fourth place. The other sizable ethnic groups in recent Jakarta are Bugis, Madurese, Palembangnese, Bantenese and Banjarnese. We can observe some homogeneous areas with a big number of concentrated ethnic groups, such as Chinese in the Glodok and Mangga Dua areas, Bugis in the Tanjung Priok area and (previously) Betawi in the Condet area. In fact, Betawi at the present time mostly live dispersed in the fringe suburban areas around Jakarta in keeping with their socio-economic status.
The trends of the 1961, 2000 and 2010 Population Censuses show the contribution of migration to the ethnic composition of Jakarta. The presence of migrants in Jakarta emphasizing socio-economic relationships makes the ethnic identity vaguely create a multi-ethnic city. In recent days, Jakartans mostly prefer to speak Bahasa Indonesia in their own style rather than their mother languages and perceive themselves as the representatives of Indonesia.
4 Castles (1967: 153) even claimed Jakarta as the 'melting pot' for various ethnic groups as well as 'the mosteven the only-Indonesian city', where 'God is making the Indonesians!' Since the Jakartans are mostly cosmopolite migrants, we argue that civic rather than ethnic politics is getting popular among them as discussed in the following parts.
Ethnicity and the Provincial Leadership of Jakarta
The leadership of Jakarta is crucial for Indonesia as it is the capital city of the country. The political situation of Jakarta will always be a reference for other cities in Indonesia and a barometer for the national politics. Ethnic politics seem to have never been in favour for most Jakartans, particularly in the current democracy era. These are at least reflected in three political regimes of Indonesia, namely Old Order, New Order and reformasi.
During the Old Order regime , Jakarta was mostly governed by national political figures. Soekarno as the first President of Indonesia, who was also a national leader for the Independence of Indonesia, 4 "… Eeh Nok, lu pan jelek-jelek anak Jakarte, masa segala neken aje nggak becus? Malu-maluin gue aja lu ah!" kata bang Amat serenta cabut kartu penduduknya dari kantong atas, "Nih kaye gue, kalo ude punye pan enak!"… "Nama… Amat bin Conat," untuk kesekian kalinya bang Amat membaca kartu penduduknya kencang-kencang, "Bangsa … Indonesia! Agama … Selam eh Islam!" (Muntaco, 2006: 251-252) . ["… Nok, you are Jakartan. How can't you make your own signature? That's a shame," bang Amat said to his wife while taking out the ID card from his pocket. "It's nice when we've had it, just like me!" …. "Name … Amat bin Conat," for the umpteenth time bang Amat read his ID card loudly, "Nation … Indonesia! Religion … Selam eh Islam!"]. This dialogue narrates the typical language spoken by the Jakartans combining Bahasa Betawi as the language of the "indigenous people" and Bahasa Indonesia. Not only multi-ethnic, but also the Jakartans perceive themselves as the centre of Indonesia, therefore, they need to be foremost in everything, such as being literate and active in civic participation as in the above story.
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Populasi Volume 24 Nomor 2 2016 encouraged the growth of nationalism for Indonesians, especially Jakartans. He not only built national projects, such as the National Monument in the centre of Merdeka Square, Central Jakarta, but also appointed national political figures as mayors of Jakarta. Only two out of the six mayors of Jakarta in this period were non-Javanese. They were Daan Jahja, from Padang and Henk Ngantung, from the Minahasa ethnic group. Rather than ethnicity, most of these mayors were appointed because of their political affiliation and credibility. The mayors of Jakarta during the Old Order regime were affiliated with the winning parties in national elections, both Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) (Indonesian National Party) led by Soekarno and Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi) (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations) incorporating Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah as the two biggest Islamic mass organizations in Indonesia.
All governors of Jakarta in the New Order regime were from the military, which reflects the authoritarian character of the New Order regime. Under the leadership of President Suharto, the second president, who led Indonesia for 32 years, the governors of Jakarta were only those having proximity as well as following his rules. The most popular governor in this time was Ali Sadikin, the only non-Javanese. This Sundanese was the longest serving governor of Jakarta, from Democracy is the strongest attribute of reformasi (1998-present) . In this regime, Indonesians insist on the decentralization of government. Based on Law No. 32 Year 2004 on Regional Autonomy, the citizens have the right to manage their own regional government as well as voting for their regional leader directly. While in the beginning of reformasi Jakarta was still governed by Sutiyoso for ten years, afterwards the Jakartans voted for their governor directly. At the first Jakarta Gubernatorial Election, it was Fauzi Bowo, a native Betawi Muslim, who gained the majority of votes. Rather than ethnicity reasons, we assume his victory was a form of proximity and affiliation with the ruling regime, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who is also the chairman of Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party). In the context of democracy, the dynamics of Jakarta's local politics have heated up since Jakarta's 2012 Gubernatorial Elections bringing 'a new hope to politics'. Jokowi's victory is evidence of populism politics in Jakarta. As highlighted by Hamid (2014) , the four factors enabling the rise of Jokowi's popularity are (1) social breakdown and declining capability of the government; (2) corruption, draining political traditions and the negative image of political parties; (3) societal changes; and (4) the emergences of forms of political representation outside of traditional political institutions. As Jokowi was voted in to be the President of Indonesia in the 2014 Presidential Elections, Ahok was appointed as Jakarta's Governor in the same year. Following his predecessor Jokowi, Ahok has continuously reformed the city governance making him the most popular, yet controversial Governor of Jakarta as will be discussed in the next part.
Jakarta's Recent Local Politics: Ahok and His Political Manoeuvers
As widely reported, in 2016 Ahok was the most searched person on Google in Indonesia. This Christian Chinese-Indonesian Governor of Jakarta has not only been popular among his adherents, but also with the opposition since he has led the city from November 2014. His popularity seems to result from his 'double-minority status' as well as his blunt communications style. Firstly, Ahok is a Chinese-Indonesian migrant from Manggar, East Belitung, who first moved to Jakarta to study for his senior high school accreditation then his bachelor degree at the end of the 1980s. Although the Chinese ethnic group stays in the fourth place of Jakarta's ethnic composition, this ethnic group remains politically discriminated against. Secondly, he is a Christian in Muslim-majority Jakarta. Furthermore, Ahok frequently criticizes and scolds not only his subordinates of assorted wrongdoing, but also expresses his stance, particularly any disagreement, directly to the public in general. He then resigned to be the running mate of Jokowi in Jakarta's 2012 Gubernatorial Elections as a member of Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra). When his predecessor, Jokowi, was elected President of Indonesia, Ahok resigned from Gerindra in September 2014 or before his inauguration as governor; therefore, he acts as a politically independent governor of Jakarta. This political manoeuvre enabled him to separate himself from the oligarchic powerful national elites in the political parties. He can carry out a lot of development projects relatively quickly by asking, mostly property owners, to pay 'fines', for such as the Semanggi interchange as well as Northern Jakarta's coast reclamation.
Implementing budget transparency was the second manoeuver of Ahok. In the beginning of 2015, the use of e-budgeting, namely kawalapbd.org, allowed Ahok to find an irregularity or misuse in Jakarta's regional budget, which cost the nation around Rp12 trillion (Pradita, 2015) . Ahok became entangled (Dwifatma, 2015) . Rather than shrinking, Ahok is perceived as 'clean'; an honest, strong leader fighting corruption, therefore, his popularity has soared rapidly.
Picture 2 A Peaceful Rally to Support Ahok against the City Councils
Ahok's third manoeuver was announcing his plan to join the Jakarta 2017 Gubernatorial Elections through an independent path distanced from political parties. This certainly creates empathy among his adherents who endorse his position with no political party affiliations. First, during the Car Free Day at the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle in Central Jakarta, on 1 March 2015, a group of people wore masks of Ahok to support him over the draft 2015 city budget (Picture 2). This was the inception of Teman Ahok (Friend{s} of Ahok) movement established on 16 June 2015, by five young people, namely Aditya Yogi Prabowo, Richard Saerang, Singgih Widiyastono, Amalia Ayuningtyas and Muhammad Fathony. 6 The main activity of this movement was primarily to collect Jakartans' ID cards as a way of supporting Ahok's independent candidacy in the next gubernatorial elections, when at least 750,000 ID cards are needed. Initiated by the young, Teman Ahok combines traditional media (including posts, booths, hotlines and gatherings) and new media (including website temanahok.com, Twitter, Facebook, Youtube and Instagram) on their movement (Table 3) .
New media is the first tool for Teman Ahok to attract public engagement. The website is used 6 This movement firstly received assistance from political consultancy institutions, particularly the CEO of the Cyrus Network, Hasan Nasbi, who works in collaboration with Sunny Tanuwidjaja, an unpaid political staffer for Ahok. Hasan trained them in campaign strategy, provided a building as a post and gave Rp500 million for initial preparations (Purnomo, Aprianto & Ernis 2016) . Later, they started to sell merchandise to finance their movement.
to provide information about Ahok, including personals, performances and achievements. It also counts down the total update of collected Jakartan ID cards. Meanwhile, the massive use of the social media is effective to gain the public's attentions; mostly of the young and the middle class. They then interconnect the online and the offline spaces through posts, booths built in several malls, such as Mall Kelapa Gading and Kuningan City, as well as other public gathering places. This can be categorized as digital activism that is internet supported with a low threshold (Van Laer and Van Aelst, 2010). The internet or new media only supports the movement. The public is required to participate directly by handing over their ID cards and giving signatures as support agreements. This certainly has lower risks for most participants. Starting on 15 June 2015, they eventually were able to collect 1 million vote pledges a year after. Ahok's decision to jump to a political party leads this movement as Tetap Ahok.
The last manoeuver of Ahok was leaving the independent path and jumping on a political party bandwagon at the end of July 2016. Towards the candidate registration period, Ahok received political parties' support, including from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the Golkar Party, the People Conscience Party (Hanura) and the National Democratic Party (Nasdem). Ahok emphasizes that his volunteers at Teman Ahok have agreed with and support his decision.
Ahok's political manoeuvers have always been controversial. His steps of being an independent governor, having a clash with the City Council on the budget draft and prioritizing an independent path in gubernatorial elections certainly have 'shaken' the country's political establishment. The voluntarism of Teman Ahok to some extent shows Ahok's strategy to demonstrate his mass support to the political parties. The decentralization in reformasi has further enhanced oligarchy in Indonesia, with local and national politicians cooperating with
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Populasi Volume 24 Nomor 2 2016 bureaucrats and business, to implement as well as manipulate policies and laws to their needs (Hadiz, 2010 and Berenschot, Nordholt & Bakker, 2016 ). Ahok's manoeuvers certainly brought 'trouble' to those oligarchic national political elites. Just like Bersih in Malaysia (Lim, 2016) , these manoeuvers encourage the public, particularly the youth in Teman Ahok, to engage in wide civic politics.
Political Contest for the Upcoming Jakarta 2017 Gubernatorial Elections
At the beginning of 2016, Ahok was topping the electability survey for Jakarta's 2017 Gubernatorial Elections. From the poll conducted by the Indonesia Survey Institute (LSI) for example, on March 2016 his electability reached 59.3% leaving other candidates behind (Tempo, 21-27 November 2016: 34-35 December. Rather than supporting Ahok explicitly, the goal of this parade was to call on the nation to maintain unity amidst recent tensions. People wearing red and white clothes and traditional attire gathered around Thamrin Boulevard to hold interfaith prayers as well as music and traditional performances. Not only in the offline space, particularly in the city of Jakarta, but also the online space has violent tension broken out. The widespread use of social media enables people to distribute hate speeches as shown in the following Table. On 24 October, the Jakarta General Elections Commission (KPU) determined the serial numbers for the three pairs of candidates running for the Jakarta 2017 Gubernatorial Elections. The serial numbers of 1, 2 and 3 were obtained consecutively by Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono-Sylviana Murni, Basuki 'Ahok' Tjahaja Purnama-Djarot Saiful Hidayat and Anies Baswedan-Sandiaga Uno. While Agus-Sylviana has political support from the Cikeas Coalition consisting of the Democratic Party, the National Mandate Party (PAN), the United Development Party (PPP) and the National Awakening Party (PKB), Anies-Sandiaga receives it from Gerindra and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The next Jakarta Gubernatorial Elections between those three pairs reflects national political contestation with three main patrons, namely the preceding President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) (Cikeas Coalition), a previous President Megawati Soekarno Putri (PDI-P) and the losing presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto (Gerindra).
Regardless of Ahok's blasphemy case, the events show the increasingly heated political contestation for the next Jakarta 
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Populasi Volume 24 Nomor 2 2016 Gubernatorial Elections. The contestation not only involves political patrons, but also the militant grassroots. This certainly supports the argument of Berenscholt, Nordholt and Bakker (2016) on the dominance of oligarchic elites and patronage politics in the democratization of Southeast Asia, including Indonesia. However, we believe that migration and ethnicities transforming Jakarta into a cosmopolitan city will also contribute to enhance the deepening civic politics of Jakartans. The recent movements and debate in the civic space, both offline and online, between hard-line Muslims, moderate Muslims and other pluralist groups provide great opportunities for most Indonesians, especially Jakartans, to learn and participate in various forms of civic politics.
Conclusion: Civic or Sectarian Politics?
The story of Jakarta provides an example of the ways migration and ethnicities influence local politics, both in political discourse and in political systems. Rather than glorifying the widespread use of social media in recent political life, we believe the current political developments are a result of many factors along the historical processes. The fact of Jakarta as a 'host city' of migrants since the colonial time and even after independence has created a multi-ethnic city with a relatively plural identity. While the Old Order introduced diversity and the New Order forced a military line in terms of Jakarta's leadership, the democratic atmosphere of recent local politics encourages more plurality and multiculturalism. Thus, for the first time in history, a Christian Chinese-Indonesian is standing in the Jakarta 2017 Gubernatorial Elections.
The political discourse in the recent Jakarta local politics highlights conservatism versus pluralism as the core of heated discursive debate. The conservatism, which is mostly from hard-line Muslim groups, sees the texts as direct messages from God and demands Islamic purification. These scripturalist networks are becoming popular and control religious institutions, such as mosques, schools and even the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) (Kloos & Berenschot, 2016) . Meanwhile, the advocates of pluralism are the minority migrants, including Christians and Chinese-Indonesians, as well as moderate Muslims. The moderate Muslims or substantialists argue for a more flexible interpretation according to modern needs and circumstances (Kloos & Berenschot, 2017) , including voting for non-Muslim leaders. The widespread use of social media speeds up the distribution of hate speech among them and speech may actually reflect the underlying problem of inequality in economic distribution as well as the stratification gap of different social classes within Indonesian society.
Concurrently, migration and ethnicities have brought changes to the political landscape of Jakarta. For the first time, there is public engagement in political movements to support their candidate in the next gubernatorial elections on an independent path with no political party affiliations. While the young people are mostly assumed to be disconnected from traditional electoral politics (Bennett, et.al., 2009; Levine, 2007; Zukin, et.al., 2006 in Lim, 2016 , Teman Ahok narrates a contradictory story. The young do not hate politics. They are willing to participate in the 'white' political practices, which they describe as clean and relatively free from the oligarchic elites, including political parties, therefore, they struggle to collect support for their independent candidate. Rather than focusing on narrow identity, they put plurality and socio-economic welfare issues at the top.
Overall, these provide space for all Jakartans to comprehend their citizenship and the civic political culture. Migration and ethnicities have transformed Jakarta into a cosmopolitan city and brought deep consequences to the dynamics of local politics. Will civic politics gain victory in a 
